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SOCIAL CAPITAL OF DIRECTORS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS
Zihan Niu* and Christopher Chen**
ABSTRACT
This Article examines how a director’s social capital might affect his or
her behavior, the board’s performance, and corporate governance, as well
as the potential normative implications of the director’s social network. We
argue that the quality of board performance could be improved where the
social network closure within the board is high and there are many nonredundant contacts beyond the board. Network closure can improve trust
and collaboration within a board, while external contacts may benefit a
company with more diverse sources of information. Moreover, different
network positioning leads to the inequality of social capital for directors.
With more social capital, a director is more likely to be powerful and
influential on the other directors on the board. Regarding the fulfillment of
their monitory function, we suggest that independent directors would be
unlikely to compromise their monitory liability when they have more social
capital on the board than the managerial directors. We demonstrate our
theory with an analysis of corporate boards of companies listed in Hong
Kong. Although it is not easy to incorporate social network analysis into
legislation or corporate governance code, our theory may further the
understanding of the function and effectiveness of different board structures
and provide some insights into the future selection of directors by a
company within an existing legal framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines how a director’s social network (and thereby
their social capital) might affect his or her behavior and how it might affect
the quality of the board’s performance. The social network structure
constituted by social ties in a corporate board provides social capital to
directors. We suggest that board performance could be higher where the
social network closure within the board is high and where there are many
non-redundant connections beyond the board, and further that the social
capital of independent directors should contribute to their board
performance more than the social capital of executive directors does. An
examination of the social capital of directors should provide policymakers,
regulators, and members of nominating committees with an additional
* Zihan Niu, Research Fellow, Singapore Management University.
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regulatory tool to evaluate board performance and the nomination of
directors.
Since the rise of modern firms, the agency problem has been an issue
for all corporate stakeholders, because of various degrees of separation of
ownership from control.1 Numerous regimes developed to address the
agency problem and to improve the corporate governance of a firm. For
example, it is common to emphasize the role of the board of directors,
which is expected to make strategic decisions, approve major transactions,
and supervise the management and operation of the firm. The 2015 version
of the Principles of Corporate Governance published by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states, “[t]he
corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the
board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.”2 Therefore,
the board is expected to be competent, diverse, and responsible, and to offer
balanced views.3 As the OECD notes, “[t]he board is chiefly responsible for
monitoring managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for
shareholders, while preventing conflicts of interest and balancing
competing demands on the corporation,” and also has the duty “to oversee
the risk management system and systems designed to ensure that the
corporation obeys applicable laws . . . .”4 Other important functions of the
board include overseeing the internal control systems covering financial
reporting and the use of corporate assets, and guarding against abusive
related-party transactions.5 For the board of directors to “effectively fulfill
their responsibilities they must be able to exercise objective and
independent judgment.”6
Numerous legal instruments (including mandatory laws, voluntary
codes, and self-regulations) have been developed, adopted, or transplanted
to enhance corporate governance standards.7 Among other requirements,8
1. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
2. ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 51 (2015).
3. See id. at 47–50, 60.
4. Id. at 45.
5. Id. at 49. These functions are often assigned to the internal auditor, who should maintain
direct access to the board. It is important that other corporate officers, such as the general counsel,
maintain similar reporting responsibilities to those of the internal auditor. Id.
6. Id.
7. See generally Cally Jordan, Cadbury Twenty Years On, 58 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2013)
(discussing the impact of the Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom in 1992 and the wide spread
adoption of corporate governance in the world since then); Donald C. Clarke, The Independent
Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006) (discussing
independent directors in China and initiatives in other Asian countries).
8. It is also common to establish board committees for specific matters. In particular, the
audit committee serves an important supervisory function and is responsible for verifying a
company’s financial accounts, liaising with internal and external auditors, and sometimes
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the instruments mandate that a certain proportion of directors must be
independent from at least the management and/or major shareholders.9 This
ensures that the board has different voices from corporate management or
the controller, enhances the diversity of views, and improves the quality of
decision-making. A higher number of independent members on the board
should also increase the quality of supervision and reduce the chance of
collusion.
In the United States, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley)10
requires all audit committee members to be independent.11 To be
independent, a director must not “accept any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the issuer; or [is not] an affiliated person of the
issuer or any subsidiary thereof.”12 Also, New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) rules require that a board must consist of a majority of independent
directors.13
The influence of Sarbanes-Oxley has spread beyond the United States.
In Asia, enhancing board independence and requiring independent directors
are considered extremely important practices.14 In the two largest
approving related party transactions. In addition, many countries also require the establishment of
a remuneration committee and a nominating committee. The former is in charge of the
remuneration of board members and key management personnel to ensure that financial incentives
and compensation are adequate in relation to their performance, while the latter handles the
nomination of new board members and reviews the independence of independent directors. It is
also commonly required that those committees be comprised of a majority of independent
directors. This feature ties board committees to board independence. Some countries also advocate
for the separation of the roles of the chairman whose function is to facilitate the discussion and
communication of opinions at board meetings and the chief executive officer (CEO) that is in
charge of the daily operation and management of the firm’s business. See, e.g., UK CODE OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE A.2.1; SINGAPORE CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012
Principle 3 and Guideline 3.1; HONG KONG CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
A.2.1. Some countries, especially those in the civil law family in East Asia (e.g., China, Japan, or
Taiwan), have taken extra measures to transplant fiduciary duties into company law. See, e.g.,
Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary
Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003) (examining the transplant of
fiduciary duties in Japan); Andrew Jen-Guang Lin, Common Law Influences in Private Law Taiwan’s Experiences Related to Corporate Law, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 107 (2009)
(discussing the introduction of common law principles, including fiduciary duties, in Taiwan).
Determining whether these policies actually enhance firm value or reduce wrongdoings requires
vigorous research.
9. See generally Dan W. Puchniak & Luh Luh Lan, Independent Directors in Singapore:
Puzzling Compliance Requiring Explanation (NUS – Centre for Law & Bus. Working Paper No.
15/03, Feb. 5, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2604067 (reflecting on
Singapore’s definition of independent directors after examining the definition from a total of 245
corporate governance codes in eighty seven jurisdictions). This study has shown that there is a
wide-spread adoption of independent directors from rich to poor countries. See generally id.
10. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
11. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301(m)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2012).
12. See id. § 301(m)(3)(B).
13. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2009).
14. See Yu-hsin Lin, Do Social Ties Matter in Corporate Governance? The Missing Factor in
Chinese Corporate Governance Reform, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 39, 40–41 (2013).
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international financial centers in the Asia Pacific region, regulators have
adopted a voluntary code of corporate governance similar to the United
Kingdom’s Cadbury Code.15 For example, Hong Kong’s 2012 Code of
Corporate Governance Practices recommends listed companies to “appoint
independent non-executive directors representing at least one-third of the
board.”16 Singapore’s Code on Corporate Governance provides that “[t]here
should be a strong and independent element on the Board . . . with
independent directors comprising at least one-third of the Board.”17 Other
civil law jurisdictions in the region also picked up the idea to varying
degrees, including economic powerhouses such as China, Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan.18
However, as directors are human beings rather than machines, it is
natural to ask whether they behave in the way the legal instruments expect
them to, particularly as the success of corporate governance regimes
depends on directors’ competence and behavior.19 Their behavior is partly
attributable to their own personality and characteristics, which cannot be
measured quantitatively. This Article suggests that the social connections of
directors create an inequality of social capital among them. While personal
attributes and strategies may have an important effect on benefits

15. See ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 12 (1992), http://www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/library/
subjects/corporate governance/financial aspects of corporate governance.ashx. For its impact, see
generally Jordan, supra note 7.
16. See HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARINGS, LTD., PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE,
CODE PROVISION AND RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES, app. 14, A.3–A.4, 6.
17. CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012, Principle 2, Guideline 2.1 (Sing.).
18. See Lin, supra note 14, at 40.
19. The independent director regime has been subject to vigorous academic researches on its
effectiveness and function. For an example, see generally Ran Duchin, John G. Matsusaka &
Oguzhan Ozbas, When Are Outside Directors Effective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (2010); Christopher
S. Armstrong, John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements In
Firm Transparency?, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 383 (2014); Jay Dahya & John J. McConnell, Board
Composition, Corporate Performance, and The Cadbury Committee Recommendation, 42 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 535 (2007); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance
and Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257 (2008); Jay Dahya, Orlin Dimitrov & John J.
McConnell, Does Board Independence Matter In Companies With a Controlling Shareholder?, 21
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 67 (2009); Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Outside Director Liability
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999);
Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855 (2014);
Christopher Chen, Solving the Puzzle of Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: The
Path of The Temasek Model in Singapore and Lessons for China, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303
(2016); Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence In The Boardroom: Just
How Far Have You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REV. 373 (2007); Yu-hsin Lin, Overseeing
Controlling Shareholders: Do Independent Directors Constrain Tunneling in Taiwan?, 12 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 363 (2011); Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director In Chinese Corporate
Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006); Roberta S. Kamel, Is The Independent Director
Model Broken?, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775 (2014).
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acquisition in a community, the structural position of an individual in a
social network can impose the most severe constraints on a director.20
Social capital empowers directors, and different kinds and strengths of
social networks and social capital may offer different kinds of chemistry in
board meetings, thereby affecting the quality of corporate governance and
corporate decision-making. Based on the existing literature, we suggest that
the structures of network closure and structural holes can provide social
capital to actors. Thus, a board with both structures would likely improve
its firm’s performance. These structures may enhance the possibility of a
director having sufficient knowledge, expertise, and external information to
benefit a company’s management, and may improve the quality of
cooperation in the boardroom. Therefore, these structures might help
corporate decision-making, at least at the board level.
Moreover, within a board of directors, social ties between directors may
cause an inequality of social capital among them. We suggest that the
differentiation of empowerment may help to undermine the negative effect
of social ties between managerial and independent directors. An
independent director may not be truly independent if he or she has a
substantial social connection (e.g., being members of the same private club)
with the managing director, even though he or she otherwise meets the
definition of “independence” (or such independence as is recognized by the
nominating committee). However, an independent director with more social
capital may be less likely than one with less social capital to relinquish his
or her supervisory power because of the social tie between him or her and
the managerial director. The reason may be that, the more social capital an
independent director has, the less likely they are to rely on the ties with
managerial directors to maintain their position on the board. To prevent the
potential compromise of the supervisory function of independent directors,
it may be reasonable to expect independent directors to have more social
capital than managerial directors. Although it is not easy to incorporate
social network analysis into legislation or corporate governance code, our
theory may help to illuminate the functions and effectiveness of different
board structures and to provide some insights into the selection of directors
by a company.
From this angle, we identify a gap in the current body of research on the
design of corporate governance regimes: how do social networks affect the
behavior of directors on the board? This has led us to develop a study on the
social networks of directors and their effects on corporate governance. In
this Article, we describe directors’ social connections as their social capital
and examine the potential effect of social capital on a director’s behavior
and the qualities of corporate governance.
20. See Daniel Brass, Being in the Right Place: A Structural Analysis of Individual Influence
in an Organization, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 518, 518 (1984).
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On the basis of social capital theories, this Article answers the
following question: in which situation would the social network structure be
most likely to improve board performance? The answer to this question
may have implications for the effectiveness of current corporate governance
regimes. In addition to theoretical analysis, we conduct case studies of a
family-controlled company and a Chinese state-owned company listed in
Hong Kong to illustrate the inequality of social capital. The case studies
also explain the potential influence of the unequal social capital on board
collaboration and the functions of different types of directors. Different
types of relationships in combination with the nature of a firm (e.g., a stateowned enterprise or family-controlled firm) may create different
interactions and chemistry.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II briefly reviews the existing
literature on social networks, social capital, and corporate governance, and
suggests an optimal structure of an effective board. Part III discusses the
normative implications of social networks for corporate governance,
illustrates two examples of real boards in Hong Kong’s list market, and
discusses the potential implications of the data on the basis of social capital
theory. Part IV concludes.
II. SOCIAL NETWORKS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
In this section, we examine how the social network of a director can
affect his or her performance and behavior in several dimensions. First, we
briefly review the general literature on social networks and the meaning of
social capital in theory. Second, we explore the relationship between social
networks, social capital, and board performance. Third, we further discuss
the effects of social capital inequality on directors’ roles and functions.
A. MEANING AND POWER OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital lends itself to multiple definitions. Bourdieu and
Wacquant define social capital as “the sum of the resources, actual or
virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance and recognition.”21 Coleman defined social capital
functionally as “a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all
consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions
of actors . . . within the structure.”22 According to Putnam, “social capital
refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of
21. PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 119
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1992).
22. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in The Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. 95,
98 (1988).
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reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.”23 From an individual
perspective, Lin defines social capital as “investment in social relations
with expected returns in the marketplace.”24
One common element in all the definitions is that social capital entails
advantages that individual or collective actors have because of their location
in the social network structure.25 People who do better are somehow better
connected.26 In other words, we can measure a person’s social capital by
measuring their connections with others and their location in the network.
While we accept that some forms of social capital may be intangible,
modern network analysis allows us to conduct a more quantitative analysis
of a person’s social capital based on their social network and connections,
which may come from kinship, marriage, previous employment or
professional relationships, multiple directorships, and educational history.
In this Article, we investigate the social capital in the social network
structure of corporate boards—that is, a structure assembled by social ties
between directors. Social ties in this Article include employment,
education, and professional and social activities. Employment ties arise
when two directors have overlapping present or prior employment in any
firm, excluding the firm for which we measure social ties.27 An educational
tie requires two directors to have graduated from the same institution.28
Professional activity ties mean that two directors share a present or past
membership in a professional association. Finally, social activity ties occur
when individuals share a present or past membership in a charity or other
non-profit organization.29 The social capital of directors is determined by
their position in the social structure, which is determined by the social ties
above.
In theory, social capital can bring information, power, and solidarity
advantages to the actors in the network.30 First, social capital may provide
actors with “access to broader sources of information and [improve]

23. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
24. NAN LIN, SOCIAL CAPITAL: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ACTION 19 (2001).
25. See generally Ronald S. Burt, The Network Structure of Social Capital, in 22 RESEARCH
IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 345, 347 (2000).
26. Id.
27. See Liesbeth Bruynseels & Eddy Cardinaels, The Audit Committee: Management
Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?, 89 ACCT. REV. 113, 119 (2014); see also Cesare
Fracassi & Geo Tate, External Networking and Internal Firm Governance, 67 J. FIN. 153, 158–59
(2010).
28. See Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy, The Small World of Investing:
Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns, 116 J. POL. ECON. 951, 952 (2008).
29. See Bruynseels & Cardinaels, supra note 27, at 119.
30. See Paul S. Adler & Seok-Woo Kwon, Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept, 27
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 17, 29 (2002).
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information’s quality, relevance, and timeliness.”31 Coleman mentions two
examples to illustrate these benefits:
A person who is not greatly interested in current events but who is
interested in being informed about important developments can save the
time of reading a newspaper by depending on a spouse or friends who pay
attention to such matters. A social scientist who is interested in being upto-date on research in related fields can make use of everyday interactions
with colleagues to do so, but only in a university in which most colleagues
keep up-to-date.32

Many studies have shown that people are able to obtain information about
job opportunities and innovation through network ties.33
Social capital also allows actors to hold some power in a network and
enables them to influence or control others. Power can be viewed as the
opposite of dependence. People in central network positions are able to
control relevant resources, thereby increasing other people’s dependence on
them and decreasing their dependence on others. Such people are in a
position to acquire power.34 For example, consider an actor X who holds the
only path between two otherwise unconnected actors Y and Z. In this
network, X can be seen as holding the highest social capital because X has
the advantage of the dependency of Y and Z.35 In addition, the nonredundant resources that X can access from both Y and Z decrease his or
her dependence on other actors in the network.
The third benefit of social capital is solidarity. Strong social norms and
beliefs, which are associated with a high degree of social network closure,
encourage compliance with local rules and customs and reduce the need for
formal controls. The solidarity benefits of closure and trust would enable
the network to lower monitoring costs, increase commitment,36 and transmit
richer and more sensitive information.37 Even if the actor does not use their
social capital resources intentionally, their social capital still has substantial
symbolic utility. Letting others know about one’s social capital may be
sufficient to promote one’s social standing, because such information
imputes the potential power of the actor.38
31. See id.
32. Coleman, supra note 22, at 104.
33. See generally Ed. A. W. Boxman, Paul M. De Graaf & Hendrik D. Flap, The Impact of

Social and Human Capital on the Income Attainment of Dutch Managers, 13 SOC. NETWORKS 51
(1991); see also Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural
Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287 (1987).
34. See generally D. J. Brass & M. E. Burkhardt, Potential Power and Power Use: An
Investigation of Structure and Behavior, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 441 (1993).
35. Id. at 446.
36. See generally William G. Ouchi, Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
129 (1980).
37. See generally D. Krackhardt & J. R. Hanson, Informal Networks: The Company Behind the
Chart, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul.-Aug. 1993, at 104.
38. LIN, supra note 24, at 44.
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Previous research has demonstrated two types of social structures—
network closure and structural holes—which provide social capital to the
actor. A network with closure means that all actors in the network are
connected with each other (Fig. 1).
Figure 1: Network without (a) and with (b) closure39
A
A
B

C
B

D

(a)

E

C

(b)

Coleman examines three benefits of social networks with closure. First,
social relations create obligations, expectations, and trustworthiness within
the network. If X does something for Y and trusts Y to reciprocate in the
future, this establishes an expectation in X and an obligation on the part of
Y. This obligation can be conceived as a credit slip held by X for future
performance by Y.40 In a structure in which “people are always doing things
for each other,”41 there are large numbers of these credit slips, often on both
sides of a relationship. Second, social capital can be used to obtain
information inherent in social relations. Information can also be better
maintained within a closure group. Third, closure leads to a set of effective
sanctions that can monitor and guide behavior. Coleman uses Figure 1 to
illustrate why:
In an open structure like that of figure 1a, actor A, having relations with
actors B and C, can carry out actions that impose negative externalities on
B or C or both. Since they have no relations with one another, but with
others instead (D and E), they cannot combine forces to sanction A in
order to constrain the actions. Unless either B or C alone is sufficiently
harmed and sufficiently powerful vis-à-vis A to sanction alone, A’s actions
can continue unabated. In a structure with closure, like that of figure 1b, B

39

See Coleman, supra note 22, at 106.
40. See id. at 102.
41. See id.
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and C can combine to provide a collective sanction, or either can reward
the other for sanctioning A.42

Thus, in a social network with closure it is less risky for individual actors to
trust each other in the group. The network of relations is an important factor
in generating trust, in establishing expectations, and in creating and
enforcing norms.43
Structural hole theory gives concrete meaning to social capital. This
theory describes how social capital is a function of brokerage opportunities
in a network (Fig. 2)44. In Figure 2, below, actor A is in the position of the
structural hole because he bridges the two subgroups consisting of actors B,
C, and D and E, F, and G. Without A, the two subgroups may not connect
with each other. The existence of a structural hole does not mean that group
BCD and group EFG are unaware of one another; it simply means that they
may be focused on their own businesses and may lack the time to become
involved in the activities of the other group.45
Figure 2: Network with a Structural Hole (A)
B

F

D

C

A

E

G

A structural hole provides a relationship of non-redundancy between
two contacts.46 “The hole is a buffer, like an insulator in an electric
circuit.”47 Through the hole between them, the two contacts provide
network benefits that are in some degree additive rather than overlapping. 48
The structural-hole argument defines social capital in terms of the
42. Id. at 105–06.
43. See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360,

1360–80 (1973).
44. This figure is made by the authors in accordance with Burt’s definition of structural hole.
45. Ronald S. Burt, Contingent Value of Social Capital, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339, 341 (1997)
[hereinafter Burt, Value of Social Capital].
46. See Burt, supra note 25, at 353.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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information and control advantages of being the broker in relationships
between people otherwise disconnected in the social structure. First,
structural holes may broker non-redundant additive sources of
information.49 “A structural hole indicates that the people on either side of
the hole circulate in the different flow of information.”50 The non-redundant
information may make the actor at the structural hole become an opinion
leader, because he or she could spread new ideas and solutions to the group.
Second, there is also a control advantage. The broker actor has the
opportunity to control the form of the projects that bring together people
from opposite sides of the structural hole.51 Without the broker actor, the
disconnected groups or actors would not be able to contact each other. This
gives the broker actor disproportionate influence in whose interests are
served when the contacts come together. Moreover, they can broker
communication while displaying different beliefs and identities to each
contact.52 The sociological theories describe a situation in which a person
derives control benefits from brokering the connection between others via
the structural hole as tertius gaudens.53 On the basis of the benefits of
information and control, Burt addresses the power benefits that accrue to
actors who bridge disconnected groups. Since these actors have a say in
whose interests are served by the bridge, they can negotiate terms that are
favorable to these interests and thus become powerful actors.54
B. SOCIAL NETWORK STRUCTURE AND BOARD PERFORMANCE
Burt argues that group performance could be highest where network
closure within the group is high and there are many non-redundant contacts
beyond the group (the Maximum Performance Model).55 Closure can
improve communication and coordination within the group, while in
spanning structural holes beyond the group, the group network can reach a
diverse set of perspectives, skills, or resources.56 Burt also discusses three
models in which a group’s performance is undermined by its network
structure. First, the group’s performance may be undermined when the
external contacts beyond the group are redundant (the Cohesive Model). In
this model, although the group benefits from communication, it contains
only one perspective, skill, or resource. Second, in a disintegrated group
with no connection between the group members (the Disintegrated Model),
49. See id.
50. Ronald S. Burt, The Gender of Social Capital, 10 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 5, 9 (1998)

[hereinafter Burt, Gender of Social Capital].
51. See Burt, Value of Social Capital, supra note 45, at 342.
52. See Burt, supra note 25, at 354.
53. See Burt, Gender of Social Capital, supra note 50, at 10.
54. See RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION
30–34 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1st ed., 1992).
55. See Burt, supra note 25, at 393.
56. See id.
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the diverse perspectives, skills, or resources may cause communication
barriers within the group, which can also undermine its performance
quality. Third, minimum performance may occur in a group without any
internal or external connection (the Minimum Performance Model).57
On the basis of Burt’s theory, we may assume that, generally, an
effective board might be a dense network of connected people in which
each director is rich in disconnected individual connections with nonredundant perspectives, skills, and resources.58 In addition, completely
forbidden social ties in the boardroom may not be desirable, because an
unconnected group may undermine the willingness for cooperation and
communication, and may foster divisiveness in the boardroom, which can
harm the efficiency of the board’s decision-making.59
However, the differences between managerial directors and
independent directors may make the performance structure of the corporate
board more complicated than that of a normal group. Research has
demonstrated that social ties in the boardroom may encourage board
involvement in administrating a firm and lead to an increase in board
effectiveness.60 The social ties between the managerial members (e.g., the
CEO) and independent directors can foster board collaboration61 and
increase the level of information sharing.62 However, the main function of
independent directors is also to supervise management and to offer
objective and differing views regarding corporate affairs. The supervisory
and monitory functions of an independent director require that they should
not only provide diverse information to the board, but also remain
uninfluenced by the managerial directors, such as the CEO.
A closer connection with the management director or controlling
shareholder means that an independent director may be more inclined to
side with them. This is particularly a problem for independent directors,
who are supposed to be “dissenting peers” and “rival authorities” to the
board.63 The social relationship between independent directors and
managerial directors, whether they are friends, former colleagues, or former
schoolmates, may compromise the monitory utility of a high proportion of
independent directors on the board.64
57. Id. at 394–95.
58. Id.
59. See John F. Olson & Michael T. Adams, Composing a Balanced and Effective Board To

Meet New Governance Mandates, 59 BUS. LAW. 421, 446–47 (2004).
60. See generally James D. Westphal, Collaboration in The Boardroom: Behavioral and
Performance Consequences of CEO- Board Social Ties, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7 (1999).
61. See generally id.
62. See generally Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN.
217 (2007).
63. See Randall Morck, Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance: Economics and Ethics
of The Devil’s Advocate, 12 J. MGMT. GOVERNANCE 179, 180 (2008).
64. See generally Bruynseels & Cardinaels, supra note 27, at 113; see also Byoung Hyoun
Hwang & Seoyoung Kim, It Pays to Have Friends, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 138 (2009) (finding that
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The arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of the social
connections between independent directors and managerial directors
highlight the ambiguity of whether including socially connected
independent directors is desirable. On the basis of social capital theory, we
argue that the effect of social ties on an independent director relates to the
inequality of social capital between him or her and the managerial directors.
C. INEQUALITY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND FUNCTIONS OF
DIRECTORS
An individual’s social capital may come from his or her position in the
network. The theory of social capital assumes that within a structure, the
accessibility and mobilization of the social resources of different individual
actors are differently distributed. Structural and positional variation in a
social network affects the opportunities of individual actors to construct and
maintain social capital.65 The location of certain actors relative to others in
the network indicates the relative advantages in access to social capital.66
The advantaged or disadvantaged structural positions lead to inequality
of social capital. On the basis of closure and structural holes, it may be
reasonable to say that in a social network, the individual actor holding the
highest level of social capital is the one with the most connections to others
or the one who occupies a structural hole. The inequality of social capital
distributed in a social structure may motivate the actors to strategically
create and maintain connections with those who have more social capital
than them. Through social network ties, an actor is able to transfer benefits
among actors in the network. Moreover, an actor’s contacts’ resources can
be sources of capital for the actor as well; these resources are potentially
available to the actor via social exchange.67
In a board setting, the variations in the network positions of different
directors represent the different levels of social capital they hold. The
inequality of the social capital of directors may influence their decisionmaking. Directors with more social capital can increase other directors’
firms “whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level
of compensation, exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnoverperformance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent”); Gopal V.
Krishnan et al., CFO/CEO-Board Social Ties, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Earnings Management, 25
ACCT. HORIZONS 537, 537–38 (2011) (finding that CFO/CEO-board social ties are positively
related to earnings management by the firm and provide evidence that the efficacy of the formal
(regulatory) definition of an independent director may be undermined by social ties); see generally
Mark S. Beasley et al., The Audit Committee Oversight Process, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 65
(2009) (suggesting that although many companies want audit committees that offer extensive
monitoring, some audit committees serve only a ceremonial role). Bruynseel and Cardinaels find
that firms with friendship ties are more likely to subsequently amend initially clean reports
because of weak internal controls. Bruynseels & Cardinaels, supra note 27, at 113.
65. See LIN, supra note 24, at 34.
66. See Burt, Value of Social Capital, supra note 45, at 340–42.
67. See Adler & Kwon, supra note 30, at 25–26.
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dependence on them and decrease others’ willingness to lose contact with
them. If, on a board, the managerial director holds a better position in the
network than the independent director, it may be reasonable to assume that
the independent director would be unlikely to risk dissenting with the
managerial director. Going against a central managerial director who is
socially connected with nearly every other director on the board would
place enormous social pressure on the independent director. In addition,
because of their strategic locations (i.e., structural holes) and positions (i.e.,
authority or supervisory capacities), these social ties may carry valued
resources to the independent directors and allow them to exercise greater
power in their decision-making.68
Directors are unlikely to risk their social relationships with those who
hold high social capital. Therefore, the monitory function of the
independent director may be compromised when executive directors hold
the central position in a closure network and/or occupy the structural hole.
Independent directors may not want to risk their relationship with
managerial directors who are more powerful by questioning or arguing with
them, but if the independent director holds a higher level of social capital
than the managerial director, the independent director may be less likely to
be influenced by the social ties between them and the managerial directors.
In conclusion, on the basis of Burt’s group performance theory and the
function of independent directors, it may be reasonable to assume that an
effectively performing board could be an internal closure group with
external diverse connections, with the independent director holding a higher
level of social capital than the managerial directors.
D. MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL INEQUALITY
The inequality of social capital among each director on a board can be
measured by their “closeness centrality” and “betweenness centrality” in the
network. Centrality is the extent to which a person is in the center of a
network. Central people have more influence in the network69 and central
positions have often been equated with opinion leadership or popularity.70
Closeness centrality represents the director’s social capital in a closure
network. A director is closeness central when they sit at short distances
from many other directors.71 Closeness measures are based on the ideas of
efficiency and independence.72 Because of their closeness to others in the
68. See generally LIN, supra note 24, at 29.
69. KATE EHRLICH & INGA CARBONI, INSIDE SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS, IBM TECH. REP.

7
(2005),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.372.1960&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
70. Thomas W. Valente et al., How Correlated Are Network Centrality Measures?, 28
CONNECTIONS 16, 17 (2008).
71. JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 86 (3rd ed., 2003).
72. Noah E. Friedkin, Theoretical Foundations for Centrality, 96 AM. J. SOC. 1478, 1490
(1991).
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network, directors “high on closeness measures are able to efficiently
transmit information and have independence, in the sense that they do not
need to seek information from more peripheral directors.”73 They have
greater access to information and can communicate their opinions to others
more efficiently. Research shows they are also more likely than peripheral
directors to use the communication channels.74
Both betweenness centrality and the clustering coefficient represent
whether the director is at a structural hole or is a bridge between two groups
of directors. Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a
particular director lies between the various other directors on the graph.75
Directors with a higher betweenness centrality are included in many of the
shortest paths between other directors. Directors high on betweenness
centrality thus have the potential to influence others near them in a
network,76 seemingly through both direct and indirect pathways. A director
with high betweenness centrality can potentially influence the spread of
information throughout the network by facilitating, hindering, or even
altering the communication between others.77 Such a director has a vital
role in enabling the directors between him or her to communicate with each
other. In some extreme cases, if a high betweenness centrality director were
removed from the network, some directors would lose their connection with
the rest of the group. Thus, when a director has a high score on betweenness
centrality, he or she is likely to occupy a structural hole.78
The clustering coefficient measures the network closure of a director,
namely, whether each director’s connections are connected to one another.
More specifically, it is the number of edges connecting a director’s
neighbors divided by the total number of possible edges between those
neighbors.79 The higher the clustering coefficient of a director, the more
closure of the cliques he or she is in. A high clustering coefficient means
that directors “tend to form tightly connected, localized cliques with their
immediate neighbors.”80 The clustering coefficient also indicates the
betweenness of an individual in their ego-network.81 It may be reasonable to
73. Thomas W. Valente et al., supra note 70, at 18.
74. See Noah E. Friedkin, Structural Bases of Interpersonal Influence in Groups: A

Longitudinal Case Study, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 861, 864 (1993).
75. See Friedkin, supra note 72, at 1491.
76. See Linton C. Freeman, Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification, 1 SOC.
NETWORKS 215, 221 (1979).
77. See generally id.
78. Martin Everett & Stephen P. Borgatti, Ego Network Betweenness, 27 SOC. NETWORK 31,
32–33 (2005).
79. See Gerald F. Davis, Mina Yoo & Wayne E. Baker, The Small World of the American
Corporate Elite, 1982-2001, 1 STRATEGIC ORG. 301, 316 (2003).
80. Christo Wilson et al., User Interactions in Social Networks and Their Implications, PROC.
4TH {ACM} EUR. CONF. ON COMPUT. SYS. 205, 209 (2009).
81. Terrill L. Frantz, A Social Network View of Post-Merger Integration, in ADVANCES IN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 161, 168 (Cary L. Cooper & Sydney Finkelstein ed., 2012).
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assume that a director with a higher score on betweenness centrality but a
lower score on the clustering coefficient sits between various other directors
in the network, but the directors that connect with them directly are not
connected with each other.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND
CASE STUDIES
On the basis of our theory in Part II, we now further explore the
normative connotations of social capital and social network structures for
policymakers, legislators, and practitioners. We will additionally use two
case studies—a family-owned company and a state-owned enterprise—to
illustrate our points.
A. WHAT ARE THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL
CAPITAL?
What does the above discussion mean for legislators, regulators, and
practitioners? As suggested above, different degrees of social capital may
influence a director’s behavior on the board, and differing corporate board
network structures may affect board performance. However, this Article
suggests that it is not feasible to legislate social capital by requiring
directors to have a certain degree of connections or to be centrality figures
in a network, or requiring a corporate board to hold a certain structure.
Social capital on an individual or aggregate level is a dynamic concept; the
connections are relative and comparative but not absolute, and it is therefore
unsuited to be assigned fixed figures. It is also challenging to describe
connections in precise legal language. Thus, it is difficult to create
certainties even if we agree that social capital could have some normative
values.
The idea of social capital may offer the market various tools for
selecting directors, predicting the performance of a corporate board, and
supervising listed companies. In other words, our social capital theory
might complement existing corporate governance regimes. For example, the
real value of independent directors comes from their external experiences
and ties, and from their ability to speak up and dissent when they have
suspicions.82 However, if corporate controllers desire a friendly but
powerless independent director, an independent director might not be truly
independent.
Moreover, the independent director regime uses a director’s
independence as a proxy for a person’s ability to supervise and speak up.

82. See generally Amy J. Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of Directors and Firm
Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives, 28 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 383 (2003).
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While the legal definitions of board independency may vary by country,83
such definitions too often focus on the director’s lack of financial ties or
business connections to the company, its management, and/or its substantial
shareholders.84 No definition of independence has yet been offered that
precludes an independent director from being a social friend of or joining
the same clubs, associations, or charities as managerial directors.85 While
there could be considerable transaction costs to define and identify such
connections, the existence of these social relationships might undermine a
person’s willingness to speak up in board meetings because of his or her
friendships or other personal concerns.
With modern technology, computing power, and big data, corporations
and market analytics now have better resources and power to analyze the
dynamic function of social capital with different board structures in the
digital era.86 Examining social capital is useful in a number of ways. First,
on the corporate level, analysis of the social capital of a director and the
structure of a board may help the nominating committee to determine the
suitability of a candidate. In many countries, the nomination of a director
has to be vetted by the nomination committee, which examines the
director’s background and independence (for independent directors).87 In
addition to hard benchmarks such as kinship, education records, or work
experience, social capital may offer the nomination committee more insight
as an additional tool to consider, examine, and predict future performance
and chemistry in an existing board structure. For example, between two
independent director candidates who otherwise have the same credentials,
the nomination committee may prefer the candidate with more external
social connections to improve the power structure of the board.
Second, social capital may offer an additional tool to the market to
predict the value of a firm. However, we agree that it is impossible to
comprehensively list all board members’ social connections and that it is
probably infeasible to require directors and companies to disclose all their
social connections. Forcing directors to disclose social connections might
lead to unprocessed and unstructured data that might be prone to biases and
errors. From commercial databases, at least, institutional or active investors
would have more tools with which to analyze board structure and directors’
83. See generally Puchniak & Lan, supra note 9.
84. Lin, supra note 14, at 54. “Nevertheless, the definition of independent under SOX and

listing agents’ rules do not exclude personal relationships or social ties.” Id.
85. Victor Brudney, The Independent Director: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597, 598–99 (1982).
86. There are now more datasets available over the Internet for researchers and merchants to
analyze social networks of different scales from various sources, including market giants such as
Facebook, Twitter, or Amazon. For example, Stanford University hosts a webpage containing
links to many large network datasets. See, e.g., Jure Leskovek, Stanford Network Analysis Project,
STANFORD UNIV., https://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
87. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04(b)(i) (2009).
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social capital, in order to further evaluate a firm’s corporate governance
standards before making an investment decision or participating in a
shareholders’ meeting. This might shift the market to push companies
toward better corporate governance.
Third, an analysis of social capital may allow regulators or stock
exchanges to better perform their market surveillance function with more
precise data on the board of directors of a company. This is in line with the
recent regulatory technology (RegTech) movement to apply information
technology and regulatory power.88 In other words, with more quantitative
data about a board’s formation and directors’ social ties, market regulators
may be in a better position to evaluate what can be expected from a board
and even the possibility of corporate scandals. For example, if most of the
directors on a firm’s board have social ties with the controlling shareholder,
such a board may lack independence (even if the firm meets the corporate
governance requirements on paper) and may not be able to effectively
monitor management performance and examine related-party transactions.
B. CASE STUDIES
1. Case Selection and Data Collection
To illustrate our theory, we conduct case studies of two companies
listed in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a typical example of the adoption of the
Anglo-American corporate governance model. The Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong’s (SEHK) 1993 listing rules required a minimum of two
independent non-executive directors; the Code of Corporate Governance
Practice of 2005 recommended that one-third of the board should be
independent.89 As of 2013, the SEHK rules, which are mandatory, now
require at least one-third of the board to be independent,90 the majority of
the audit committee members to be independent non-executive directors,
and the audit committee to be chaired by an independent non-executive
director. The new regulations have changed the internal management and
supervisory structure of Hong Kong listed companies. From 2006 to 2012,
between 84% and 100% of Hong Kong listed companies had a board of at
least one-third independent directors.91

88. In general, regulatory technology (RegTech) means the application of technology to
regulatory activities. Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A
Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 598
(2016).
89. CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.1 (2005).
90. HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD., MAIN BOARD LISTING RULES: RULES
GOVERNING THE LISTING OF SECURITIES ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG LIMITED ch.
3, Rule 3.10A.
91. HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARINGS LTD., ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRACTICES DISCLOSURE IN 2006 ANNUAL REPORTS 18 (2008); see also HONG KONG EXCHS. &
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However, increasing the proportion of independent directors might not
actually bring “dissenting peers” into Hong Kong listed companies.
Although the directors are independent from the company in the regulatory
sense, they might still be connected with inside directors on the board,
especially with the CEO or chairman. For example, an independent director
and an inside director may serve together on the board of another company,
or they may have worked together in the past, studied at the same
university, joined the same social or business club, or worked for the same
charity.
In addition, “friendly” boards may be more common in the Hong Kong
market than in Western markets such as the United States and United
Kingdom. Previous research shows that the Hong Kong market seems more
acceptable to collectivist management culture than Western markets.92
Collectivist management culture might make Hong Kong companies more
likely to include connected independent directors on the board. Under a
collectivist culture, “boundaries between in-groups and out-groups are
stable, relatively impermeable, and important.”93 Therefore, it may be
reasonable to assume that the inside directors in Hong Kong companies
want people who are socially connected with them as independent directors.
This Article uses two boards as examples to introduce the social
connections among board directors and the potential influences of
inequality in social capital on board performance. The first firm studied is a
family-controlled property development company, Cheung Kong Holdings
(CKH). CKH was incorporated in Hong Kong in the early 1970s. The
founder has chaired the company since it was incorporated and his son has
been its managing director since the late 1990s, when he replaced his father
in that position. In 2011, CKH reported having nearly 110 subsidiaries,
associated entities, and jointly controlled entities. As of the end of 2014,
CKH had eight executive directors, six non-executive directors, and seven
independent non-executive directors on its board. The proportion of
independent directors is in line with Hong Kong regulations.
The second firm studied is China Mobile Limited (China Mobile), a
state-owned telecommunications company that is directly controlled by the
CLEARINGS LTD., ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES DISCLOSURE IN 2012
ANNUAL REPORTS (2013).
92. Geert Hofstede, Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning, 1 ASIA PAC. J.
MGMT. 81, 83–85 (1984). Hofstede defines the collectivist culture dimension as “a preference for
a tightly knit social framework in which individuals can expect their relatives, clan, or other ingroup to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.” Id. at 83. He tests the
individualism-collectivism scale using employees from forty countries. The subjects from all three
Chinese societies (Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) had high scores on collectivism. In
contrast, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australian subjects had much higher scores on
individualism. Id. at 85.
93. Daphna Oyserman, Heather M. Coon & Markus Kemmelmeier, Rethinking Individualism
and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses., 128 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 3, 5 (2002).
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government of the People’s Republic of China. It is also a public company
listed on the NYSE and the SEHK. At the end of 2014, China Mobile had
six executive directors and four independent non-executive directors on its
board. This proportion is also in line with the regulations.
CKH and China Mobile are chosen for two reasons. First, familycontrolled companies and state-owned Chinese companies are the two most
common types of enterprises listed in Hong Kong. Second, because both
CKH and China Mobile are large companies in terms of market
capitalization, it is less difficult for them to bear the costs of finding and
hiring directors who are both legally and socially independent from the
company. This minimizes the objective impossibility (i.e., financial
difficulty) of the company to have non-connected independent directors on
the board and makes CKH and China Mobile good examples for
investigating companies’ subjective choices.
We obtained background information on the employment information,
education history, and other non-corporate activities of all the directors who
were on the boards of CKH and China Mobile at the 2014 fiscal year-end
from BoardEx.94 With regard to employment information, BoardEx reports
all past and present positions held, including the names of the organizations
and job titles. It also provides information on current and previous board
positions held and the roles that individuals assumed on each board (e.g.,
independent director, financial expert, or board committee member).
BoardEx also includes information on the educational background of each
individual, including institutions attended, degrees earned, dates of
graduation, and an individual’s membership in professional and nonprofessional associations and government positions. This information helps
us to create networks of directors in CKH and China Mobile that exclude
their relationships with colleagues within these two companies.
We use an open source software tool, NodeXL, to visualize the social
networks of board directors in the above two companies. NodeXL was
“designed especially to facilitate learning the concepts and methods of
social network analysis with visualization as a key component.”95 It can
also show graph metrics to provide quantitative measures that characterize
various aspects of a graph.96 The graph metrics include “overall metrics”
94. The “BoardEx database contains biographical information on most board members and
senior executives around the world. Approximately 25% of the individuals are currently serving
on boards of companies and 75% are either board members or part of the C-Suite. These
individuals are associated with over 800,000 global organizations.” See BoardEx Data,
BOARDEX, http://corp.boardex.com/data/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). BoardEx database has
currently been used by finance and accounting researchers to investigate the effect director
network. See, e.g., Joseph Engelberg, Pengjie Gao & Christopher A. Parsons, Friends With
Money, 103 J. FIN. ECON. 169, 172 (2012); see also Bruynseels & Cardinaels, supra note 27, at
119.
95. Derek Hansen, Ben Shneiderman & Marc Smith, Analyzing Social Media Networks:
Learning by Doing with NodeXL, 28 COMPUTING 1, 8 (2009).
96. Id. at 22.
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and “vertex metrics.” Overall metrics summarize some of the key properties
of the entire network, such as connected component, density, and geodesic
distance. Vertex metrics specifically describe the social capital each node
experiences in the network, in measures such as degree, closeness and
betweenness centrality, and the clustering coefficient.97
2. The Case of Cheung Kong Holdings: An Example of a
Family-Controlled Firm
Graph 1 shows the board structure of CKH in 2014, which represents a
closure network. Based on the social network of the CKH directors, we can
see whether the managerial directors, especially the chairman and CEO,
hold higher closeness centrality in the network, and then we interpret the
potential influence of the social capital inequality on board performance.
We created director-by-director networks based on the disclosure of
each director’s employment (other than at CKH), educational background,
and membership in other professional and social associations and in
government.

97. Id. at 24–25.
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Graph 1: Visualization of the CKH Network

In Graph 1, each node represents a director. The different sizes of the
nodes indicate the degrees of the various directors, where the degrees
represent the number of other nodes to which a node is adjacent. The data
report two types of degrees of director: the degree on the board and the
degree with other corporate elites in the overall database. The edges
between the two nodes represent the social ties between two directors. We
label the social ties on the basis of employment (i.e., shared current or past
employment or directorships at firms other than CKH), past education (i.e.,
graduating from the same university), and shared membership in
professional associations, government, or other nonprofessional activities,
including shared memberships in nonprofit institutions, such as charities or
other social associations. The width of the edges indicates the number of
ties between two directors. Graph 1 shows that all directors on the CKH
board hold either professional or social connections with other directors,
even excluding their relationships with colleagues at CKH. Table 1 shows
the proportions of the different types of ties among the directors.
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Table 1: Types of Ties – CKH
Type of Tie
Employment
(other than CKH)

Proportion
84.3%

Number
431

Professional Association
Nonprofessional Activity

0.3%
8.2%

2
42

Government
Education

5.1%
2.1%

26
10

Graph 1 also shows that the network structure has high closure: each
director connects with at least three other directors and none of them is
isolated. The network closure is also demonstrated by the overall metrics
(Table 2), which show that the network includes only one connected
component without specific subgroups. Network closure can also be
measured by graph density, which describes the general level of linkage
among the nodes in the graph. Graph density is defined as the number of
unduplicated ties in the network divided by the total possible number of
unduplicated ties.98 The measure of density can vary from 0 to 1. When the
density is close to 1, the graph is “complete,” in that the number of ties is
the same as the possible number of ties. As seen in Table 2, the density is
0.61, which means that the actual unduplicated ties are not substantially
fewer than the possible number of ties.
Network closure can also be measured by geodesic distance, which
captures how far away a given director is to all the other directors in the
network.99 The data show that the maximum geodesic distance is 2 (1.3 on
average). This means that regardless of their CKH relationships, any
director in this group can easily get in touch with any other one in a
maximum of two steps of connection.
Table 2: Overall Metrics – CKH
Overall Metric
Connected Components
Maximum
Geodesic

Values
1
2

98. See generally Valente et al., supra note 70, at 5.
99. Roy C. Barnes, Structural Redundancy and Multiplicity Within Networks of US Corporate

Directors, 43 CRITICAL SOC. 37, 53 (2017).
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1.319728
0.614285714

Table 3 shows the vertex metrics of each director on the board. It shows
the type of directors on the board of CKH—executive directors, nonindependent non-executive directors, and independent non-executive
directors. It also demonstrates the inequality of social capital between
directors through the vertex metrics of each director, which include degrees
in market (i.e., the overall connections of each director in the entire
BoardEx database), degrees on the board (i.e., the unduplicated social
connections of directors on the CKH board), closeness and betweenness
centrality, and the clustering coefficient.
Table 3: Vertex Metrics of Directors on the Board – CKH
Betweenness
Centrality

Closeness
Centrality

Clustering
Coefficient

17

7.532143

0.043478

0.713235

2160

20

27.47619

0.05

0.573684

NED

342

3

0

0.027027

1

Chia
(Grace)
Ching Woo

ED

183

12

0

0.035714

1

Siu
Hon Leung

NED

406

5

0.125

0.028571

0.9

Sun
(Davy)
Keung
Chung
Doctor
Kwok
(Justin)
Hung Chiu

ED

571

13

1.077381

0.037037

0.910256

ED

764

14

2.09881

0.038462

0.846154

Type

Degree

Degree

of

in

on

Director

Market

Board

Ka-Shing Li
(Chairman)

ED

541

Tzar
(Victor)
Kuoi
Li (CEO)
Kun
(Roland)
Chee Chow

ED

Directors
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George
Colin
Magnus
Doctor
Yeh
(Charles)
Kwong Lee

367

NED

495

11

2.492857

0.034483

0.8

NED

826

11

3.203571

0.034483

0.727273

Tak
(Edmond)
Chuen Ip

ED

546

16

3.74881

0.041667

0.783333

Yee
(Ezra)
Wan Pau

ED

204

14

5.488095

0.038462

0.813187

Hing
Lam Kam

ED

870

17

5.52619

0.043478

0.735294

Frank
John Sixt

NED

742

12

6.177381

0.035714

0.69697

Tun-li
(Stanley)
Kwok
(IND)
Nin
(Albert)
Mow Chow
Yuan
(Anthony)
Chang Yeh
Doctor
Yick-Ming
(Rosanna)
Wong

IND

367

4

0

0.027778

1

IND

183

12

0

0.035714

1

IND

218

12

0

0.035714

1

IND

1014

8

1.317857

0.03125

0.75

Kin-Ning
(Canning)
Fok
Simon
Murray

IND

1660

10

1.6

0.033333

0.844444

IND

1592

16

3.74881

0.041667

0.783333

IND

800

16

4.515476

0.041667

0.758333

IND

1020

15

4.871429

0.04

0.771429

Ying-chew
(Henry)
Cheong
Siu-lin
(Katherine)
Hung
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Mean
(total)

738.285
7

12.285
71

3.857143

0.036938

0.828901

Mean
(Nonindependent
director)
Mean
(Independe
nt director)

665.384
6

12.692
31

4.995879

0.037583

0.807645

856.75

11.625

2.006697

0.03589

0.863442

* ED: Executive director
NED: Non-independent non-executive director
IND: Independent non-executive director

The data show that all the directors also have external ties with other
people in the market. Because the number of each director’s external
connections varies, it may be reasonable to assume that the external
connections of each director may not overlap extensively and will thus
bring non-redundant contacts to the board. Therefore, the CKH board
network structure is in line with Burt’s Maximum Performance Model. The
mean of the degree in the market of independent directors (856.75) is much
higher than that of other directors (665.38), which indicates that the
independent directors are likely to be able to fulfill their information
function.
Victor Li, the CEO, and Ka-shing Li, the Chairman, hold the highest
degrees on the board and in the overall dataset, and the highest scores of
closeness centrality and betweenness centrality. Ka-shing Li is the founder
of CKH and the Chairman of the board. Victor Li, his son, is the CEO and
deputy chairman of the board. On the basis of social capital theories, Victor
Li should be the most influential actor in this group of directors.
In sum, from the board structure of Cheung Kong Holdings in 2014, we
find that all directors had social ties in addition to being members of the
board of the same company. Their social ties were on average very close, as
supported by the high graph density of the network and the small geodesic
distance. In addition, the high number of directors’ external connections
enables the network structure of the board to maximize its performance.
Also, the founder’s family member (CEO) holds the most central position
in the network.
The board of CKH is a high closure group in which every director is
connected such that no one can escape the notice of others.100 Network
closure affects access to information.101 If a director wants information,
they can obtain it from an acquaintance connected with them rather than
100. Burt, supra note 25, at 351.
101. Id.
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searching for it on their own. In addition, network closure facilitates
sanctions that make it less risky for directors on the board to trust one
another.102 The commonly existing connections in the network make a
director’s wrongful behavior quickly become public to the board as a
whole, and the connected directors can combine to collectively sanction the
wrongdoer. This makes the directors more careful about the image they
display to the group, which increases the confidence with which each can
trust the others to cooperate.
Effective communication and coordination between directors would
improve the efficiency of the board’s operational process. The appropriate
organization of an effective business network can reduce knowledgesharing expenses by more than 50%.103 In addition, the trust between
directors can reduce the cost of negotiation. Since every director trusts the
others, each might believe that one of the others would not make a wrong
decision and then abscond, leaving the other with a loss. This lower risk
may simplify the negotiation process when making decisions.104
However, this board network also shows a “center-periphery
pattern.”105 This pattern consists of “(1) a subset of relatively central
prestigious actors who are connected by direct or short indirect channels,
and (2) a subset of peripheral actors who are more directly connected to the
central actors than to other peripheral actors.”106 In such a social
organization, an actor is more influenced by a centrally located actor than
by a peripheral actor.107 The central director in the network is Victor Li, the
CEO and son of the company’s founder, who holds the highest closeness
centrality in the network. Victor’s structural centrality contributes to his
social power on the board. The network’s closure better enables Victor and
the founding family of the company to influence the board’s decisionmaking. Victor’s opinion may be more influential to the other directors
because he more readily can acquire information resources and can easily
communicate his opinions to the other directors. First, Victor can
effectively collect information from the entire board because he holds the
shortest distances to the other directors and no one can block him from
obtaining information from any of the directors. Second, as a central
director, Victor is likely to have more numerous or shorter communication

102. Id.
103. See TATIANA BOUZDINE & MARINA BOURAKOVA-LORGNIER, THE ROLE

OF SOCIAL
CAPITAL WITHIN BUSINESS NETWORKS: ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL AND RELATIONAL
ARGUMENTS (2004).
104. See generally Jeffrey H. Dyer & Wujin Chu, The Role of Trustworthiness in Reducing
Transaction Costs and Improving Performance: Empirical Evidence from the United States,
Japan, and Korea, 14 ORG. SCI. 57 (2003).
105. Friedkin, supra note 74, at 864.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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channels with which to convey his opinion to other directors, and he may be
more active in utilizing these channels.
Third, the closure network makes Victor’s opinion trustworthy to the
other directors. Because Victor directly connects to all the other directors,
he may have mutual friends with many of the directors on the board. For
example, because Victor connects to both Stanley and Albert, if Stanley and
Albert also connect, then Victor has a mutual friend with each of them. The
existence of mutual friends makes Victor easier to trust.108 The other
directors might assume that if Victor cheats them, news of his cheating
behavior would reach them quickly once a “mutual friend” discovered it. It
would be reasonable for them to believe that Victor would not risk his
reputation by cheating. Therefore, the other directors, including the
independent directors, may not be willing to challenge Victor’s opinion.
The board structure of CKH reflects a finding of previous research.
Leung et al. show that family firms prefer non-independent corporate
boards to avoid any threat to their authority and any potential interference in
their decision-making processes. However, a non-independent board may
not necessarily undermine firm performance. Family managers or familyrelated managers in such firms have the incentive to make decisions in the
best interests of the family.109
In sum, the CKH board’s closure may reduce the cost of
communication and improve cooperation between the directors. The centerperiphery pattern makes the CEO the highest social power within the
network. He can influence the decision-making of the other directors,
including the independent directors. The power of the central director may
make other directors, including the independent directors, more likely to
trust his decisions and less likely to adopt an adversarial stance by
challenging him. Therefore, the monitory function of board independence
may be undermined. However, because family managers have the incentive
to benefit the company, a non-independent board might not significantly
harm firm performance.
What does this data mean for regulators and market participants? The
example of Cheung Kong Holdings shows that this family-owned business
tends to appoint people from a close and connected circle to positions on its
board, including independent directors. This does not deviate from the
general impression that family-owned businesses tend to hire friendly or
connected persons as directors. However, on this basis, regulators and
market participants should draw comparisons with other companies and
financial data to make further inferences.
108. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 491–93 (1985).
109. See Sidney Leung, Grant Richardson & Bikki Jaggi, Corporate Board and Board
Committee Independence, Firm Performance, and Family Ownership Concentration: An Analysis
Based on Hong Kong Firms, 10 J. CONTEMP. ACCT. ECON. 16, 19 (2014).
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3. The Case of China Mobile Limited: An Example of a StateOwned Company
The social structure of the China Mobile board is analyzed in the same
way as that of CKH.
Graph 2: Visualization of the China Mobile Network

Graph 2 shows that the board of China Mobile has a structural hole.
Unlike CKH, which has five types of ties, the board of China Mobile only
includes employment, education, and government ties.
Table 4: Type of Ties – China Mobile
Type of Tie
Employment
Government
Education

Proportion
83.9%
3.2%
12.9%

Number
40
2
8
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Table 5 shows the overall graph metrics of the network. Compared with
the network structure of the CKH directors, although the overall metrics
show that the social network includes one connected component, it is
obvious that the component includes two subgroups linked by one bridging
director. This means that the “bridge” director is able to control the
information flow between the two groups of directors. The table also shows
that the density is 0.47 for China Mobile, which is less than that for CKH
(0.61). The maximum geodesic distance is 4 (on average 1.74), which is
much higher than that of CKH (2 maximum). The overall metrics show
that, although all the directors on the board of China Mobile are connected,
the network structure is looser than that of CKH.
Table 5: Overall Metrics – China Mobile
Overall Metric
Connected Components

Values
1

Maximum Geodesic Distance (Diameter)

4

Average Geodesic Distance
Graph Density

1.74
0.466666667

Table 6 shows the types of China Mobile directors and the vertex
metrics of each director on the board, which represents the unequal
distribution of social capital in the social network.
Table 6: Vertex Metrics of Directors on the Board – China Mobile
Director

Yue
Li
(CEO)
Yuejia
Sha
(Chairm
an)
Aili Liu
Guohua
Xi
Madam
Wenlin
Huang

Type
of
Director
ED

Degree
in
Market
55

Degree
on
Board
6

Betweenness
Centrality

Closeness
Centrality

Clustering
Coefficient

8

0.076923

0.733333

ED

167

6

8

0.076923

0.733333

ED

48

5

0

0.058824

1

ED

26

5

0

0.058824

1

ED

467

5

0

0.058824

1
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Taohai
Xue

ED

40

5

0

0.058824

1

Doctor
Ka
Shui Lo

IND

1096

4

18

0.071429

0.333333

Kwong
(Frank)
Shing
Wong
Man
(Paul)
Yiu
Chow

IND

1077

2

0

0.05

1

IND

1329

3

8

0.052632

0.333333

IND

968

1

0

0.037037

0

Mean
(total)

527.3

4.2

4.2

0.060024

0.713333

Mean
(Nonindepen
dent
director)
Mean
(IND)

133.833
3

5.33333
3

2.666667

0.064857

0.911111

1117.5

2.5

6.5

0.052775

0.416667

Doctor
Mo
(Moses)
Chi
Cheng
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*ED: Executive Director
IND: Independent non-executive director

Similar to CKH, the directors of China Mobile also connect externally
with non-board persons in the market. Thus, the board’s network structure
is also in line with Burt’s Maximum Performance Model. Moreover, the
mean of the degree in the market of independent directors (1117.5) is also
much higher than that of managerial directors (133.83). It may be
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the board depends highly on the
independent directors to bring in non-redundant contacts and information.
Among all the directors, Yue Li, the CEO, and Yuejia Sha, the
Chairman, hold the highest scores of degree and closeness centrality.
However, the highest score of betweenness centrality is held by
independent director Dr. Ka Shui Lo, who also holds a low score of
clustering efficiency in the network. Therefore, he is located at a structural
hole.
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As a bridge, Dr. Ka Shui Lo may be less likely to be influenced by the
managerial directors’ decisions, because he has more information
advantages and power on the board than the other directors. First, Dr. Ka
Shui Lo’s bridge connection to the subgroups of both managerial directors
and independent directors gives him an advantage with respect to
information access. He reaches a higher volume of information with less
redundancy because of the diversity of his contacts across the whole board.
For the directors on both sides of him, Dr. Ka Shui Lo is more likely to be a
candidate discussed for inclusion in new opportunities. These benefits
would increase other directors’ desire to maintain their connections with Dr.
Ka Shui Lo.110 Moreover, his location at a structural hole allows Dr. Ka
Shui Lo to control information diffusion. He controls the projects that bring
together directors from opposite sides of him.111 He would be able to choose
what information should be passed to the other side and what should not.
This control of information and communication may give him more power
on the board.
The social ties between managerial directors and Dr. Ka Shui Lo would
improve the collaboration between the two diverse groups. First, the
independent directors, who also are the audit committee members, are much
closer with each other than with the managerial directors, and the broker is
also an independent director. This structure may allow the audit committee
to make its own group decisions without being influenced by managerial
directors. To obtain more information from the audit committee, the
managerial director group would have to respect Dr. Ka Shui Lo as a
broker. Second, the social ties between the CEO, the broker, and the audit
committee member could make it easier for them to trust each other, which
would improve the level of information exchange and board collaboration.
Compared with the case of CKH, the independent director on the board
of China Mobile may function better from the perspective of monitoring.
The board of China Mobile has an obvious structural hole. The managerial
directors and independent directors comprise two subgroups on the board.
The CEO is the central director who connects with most of the other
directors. However, an independent director is at the structural hole, which
connects the subgroups of the managerial directors and independent
directors. This structural advantage enables this independent director to
enjoy more social capital and to be more powerful on the board, because he
controls the passage of information between the two subgroups. Therefore,
he may be less likely to compromise his monitory liability subject to the
power of the managerial director. The social tie between him and the
managerial directors may be more likely to facilitate information exchange

110. Burt, supra note 25, at 354.
111. Id.
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and board collaboration and less likely to undermine the independent
directors’ ability to monitor.
The data also show that the independent directors hold much higher
external connections outside the board than the managerial directors. These
information advantages would make the managerial directors respect their
opinions during board meetings and could make the independent directors’
decisions less likely to be affected by the managerial directors.
In conclusion, being located at a structural hole creates two advantages
for the independent director Dr. Ka Shui Lo. First, he can access nonredundant sources of information. Second, he can control the contacts
between the directors on both sides of him. These advantages may make the
other directors, including the managerial directors, respect him and pay
attention to the information transmitted through him. In addition, the
separation of managerial and independent directors and the high number of
the independent directors’ external connections may make the independent
directors more likely to make their own group decisions without being
influenced by the managerial directors.
Other than the boards of CHK and China Mobile, which fall under the
Maximum Performance Model, we also find firms in the SEHK that fit the
Disintegrated Model. In these firms, the directors on the board hold external
connections but are not socially connected according to this Article’s
definition of social ties. Therefore, although the board members can benefit
from the external networks of the directors, especially the independent
directors, the low closure within the groups may undermine the
communication and coordination in the boardroom, which may further
undermine the quality of board performance. Although they can be seen as
very independent boards, the performance quality of these boards might not
be good. Boards that fit the Cohesive Model and the Minimum Performance
Model may not be easy to find. Boards on which no director has any
external connections are uncommon, and it is difficult to find companies in
which the external connections of all the directors are also connected with
each other.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new exchange regulations require firms to increase the
representation of independent directors on their boards. On the basis of the
social capital theories, this Article investigates how directors’ social capital
might affect the directors’ behavior, the quality of board performance, and
corporate governance, and the potential normative implications of directors’
social networks. This Article argues that the network structure of a
corporate board may influence the performance of the board. The quality of
board performance could be improved when the social network closure
within the board is high and there exist many non-redundant contacts
beyond the board. Network closure can improve the trust and collaboration
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within a board, while external contacts may benefit a company with more
diverse sources of information.
Moreover, different network positions can lead to inequality in the
social capital of directors. With more social capital, a director is more likely
to be powerful and to have influence over the other directors on the board.
On the basis of closure network theory and structural hole theory, we
further suggest that independent directors would be unlikely to compromise
their monitory liability when they have more social capital on the board
than the managerial directors. When the managerial director holds more
social capital than the independent directors, the independent directors will
be less likely to challenge the decisions of the managerial director.
We demonstrate our theory with an analysis of the corporate boards of
companies listed in Hong Kong. In CKH, the closure of the network makes
the decisions of the managerial director (CEO), who has a high level of
closeness centrality, more visible and trustworthy to the others on the board.
The social ties between the managerial director and the independent
directors may compromise the monitory efficiency of the independent
directors as a result of the inequality of social capital. In China Mobile,
however, the independent director, who is located at a structural hole,
controls access to non-redundant sources of information and contact
between the directors on both sides of him. The other directors will thus
show more respect to him and pay attention to his opinions. The social ties
between him and the other directors may help to decrease divisiveness in
the boardroom and facilitate collaboration and information sharing between
the managerial and independent directors.
Although it is not easy to incorporate social network analysis into
legislation or corporate governance code, the findings in this Article may
help further examination of the function and effectiveness of different board
structures and provide some insights into the selection of directors by
companies within an existing legal framework.

